trary to their own long-term self-interest, often with Rational choice requires that visceral factors be taken into account. It makes good sense to eat when full awareness that they are doing so.
The defining characteristics of visceral factors are, first, hungry, to have sex when amorous, and to take pain killers when in pain. However, many classic patterns a direct hedonic impact, and second, an influence on the relative desirability of different goods and actions. Hun-of self-destructive behavior, such as overeating, sexual misconduct, substance abuse, and crimes of pasger, for example, is an aversive sensation that affects the desirability of eating. Anger is also typically unpleasant sion, seem to reflect an excessive influence of visceral factors on behavior. As the intensity of a specific visand increases one's taste for various types of aggressive actions. Physical pain is, needless to say, painful and ceral factor increases, its influence on behavior tends to increase and to change in a characteristic fashion. enhances the attractiveness of pain killers, food, and sex. Although from a purely formal standpoint one could re-At low levels of intensity, people seem to be capable of dealing with visceral factors in a relatively optimal gard visceral factors as inputs into tastes, such an approach would obscure several crucial qualitative differ-fashion. For example, someone who is slightly sleepy might decide to leave work early or to forgo an eveences between visceral factors and tastes:
ning's planned entertainment so as to catch up on (1) Changes in visceral factors have direct hedonic sleep. There is nothing obviously self-destructive consequences, holding actual consumption constant. In about these decisions, even though they may not that sense, visceral factors resemble consumption, not maximize ex post utility in every instance. Increases tastes. Whether I would be better off having one set in the intensity of visceral factors, however, often or preferences or another is an abstract philosophical produce clearly suboptimal patterns of behavior. For question; whether I would be better off hungry or satiexample, the momentary painfulness of rising early ated, angry or calm, in pain or pain-free, in each case produces ''sleeping in'' -a behavioral syndrome with holding consumption constant, is as obvious as whether wide-ranging negative consequences. It is at interme-I would prefer to consume more or less, holding tastes diate levels of intensity that one observes the classic and visceral factors constant.
cases of impulsive behavior and efforts at self-con-(2) Changes in visceral factors are predictably corretrol -e.g., placing the alarm clock across the room lated with external circumstances (stimulation, depri-(Schelling, 1984) . Finally, at even greater levels of vation, and such) and do not imply a permanent change intensity, visceral factors can be so powerful as to in a person's behavioral dispositions. In contrast, virtually preclude decision making. No one decides changes in preferences are caused by slow experience to fall asleep at the wheel, but many people do. and reflection, are typically not anticipated, and do im-
The overriding of rational deliberation by the influply a permanent change in behavior.
ence of visceral factors is well illustrated by the behav-(3) Visceral factors typically change more rapidly ior of phobics who are typically perfectly aware that than tastes. Tastes also change, but tend to be stable the object of their fear is objectively nonthreatening, in the short run.
but are prevented by their own fear from acting on this (4) Finally, tastes and visceral factors draw on difjudgment (Epstein, 1994, p. 711) . It can also be seen ferent neurophysiological mechanisms. As Pribram in behaviors commonly associated with addiction, such (1984, p. 2) writes, ''the core of the brain . . . uses as that of Charlie T, a former heroin addict whose urine chemical regulations to control body functions. The contest showed that he had suddenly used heroin after a figuration of concentrations of these chemicals, allong hiatus. Charlie was ''overwhelmed by an irresistthough fluctuating around some set point, is sufficiently stable over periods of time to constitute steady ible craving and . . . rushed out of his house to find 'states.' These states apparently are experienced as some heroin. . . . It was as though he were driven by hunger, thirst, sleepiness, elation, depression, effort, some external force he was powerless to resist, even comfort, and so on.'' Their common neurochemical basis though he knew while it was happening that it was a may explain why so many behavior disorders associ-disastrous course of action for him '' (Goldstein, 1994 , ated with visceral factors-e.g., overeating, compulsive p. 220, emphasis added). Behavior at variance with shopping, phobias, and drug addictions-appear to be susceptible to moderation by a single drug: Fluoxetine portant interdependencies between them. Tastes are importantly (Messiha, 1993) . Tastes, in contrast to visceral factors, shaped by visceral factors. For example, one's taste for barbecued consist of information stored in memory concerning the chicken may well underlie one's visceral reaction to the smell of corelative desirability of different goods and activities. 2 mingled charcoal, grease, and tomato sauce. At the same time, the visceral hunger produced by such smells, and the visceral pleasure 2 Although visceral factors are distinct from tastes in underlying produced by subsequent consumption, are likely to reinforce one's preexisting taste for barbecued chicken. mechanisms and effects on well-being and behavior, there are im-deliberation, however, is by no means confined to the tioning. 4 Similarly, though by mutual agreement, labor negotiations are commonly structured to go ''round the realm of the ''abnormal.'' Adam Smith, for example, who is widely viewed as a proponent of enlightened clock'' as the strike deadline approaches. Rarely is new information produced in these last sessions, nor is self-interest, described his own internal conflict-presumably in the face of sexual desire-as follows:
there a discussion of technicalities of agreement. Perhaps, however, both sides recognize that mutual willAt the very time of acting, at the moment in which passion ingness to make concessions will be enhanced when mounts the highest, he hesitates and trembles at the thought of sleep is the reward for speedy reconciliation.
what he is about to do: he is secretly conscious to himself that Decision theory, as it is currently practiced, makes he is breaking through those measures of conduct which, in all no distinction between visceral factors and tastes and his cool hours, he had resolved never to infringe, which he had never seen infringed by others without the highest disapprobathus does not recognize the special impact of visceral tion, and the infringement of which, his own mind forebodes, factors on behavior. It is best equipped to deal with must soon render him the object of the same disagreeable senti-''cool'' or ''dispassionate'' settings in which there is typiments. (1892/1759, p. 227) cally a very close connection between perceived selfinterest and behavior. The decision-making paradigm Success, in many professions, is achieved through has much greater difficulty in providing an account of a skillful manipulation of visceral factors. Automobile decisions occurring at the ''hot'' end of the continuum salespersons, realtors, and other professionals who use defined by the intensity of visceral factors. The drive ''high pressure'' sales tactics, for example, are skillful mechanism of Freudian and behavioristic psychology manipulators of emotions. Con men are likewise expert provides a better account of behavior at the opposite at rapidly invoking greed, pity, and other emotions that end of the same continuum. The decline of the behavcan eclipse deliberation and produce an override of noriorist paradigm in psychology can be attributed to its mal behavioral restraints. Cults and cult-like groups failure to make sense of volitional, deliberative, behavsuch as ''EST'' use food deprivation, forced incontiior. Does the decision-making paradigm face a similar nence, and various forms of social pressure in their fate if it fails to address the full range of visceral influefforts to recruit new members (Cinnamon & Farson, ences? My intent is to show that visceral influences on 1979; Galanter, 1989) . In all of these cases there is a behavior can, in fact, be expressed in decision-theoretic strong emphasis on the importance of immediate acterms. Section II below addresses the question of why tion-presumably because influence peddlers recogand how visceral factors create discrepancies between nize that visceral factors tend to subside over time. The perceived self-interest and behavior. Section III enucar or house one is considering will be ''snapped up'' if merates a series of propositions concerning the effect not purchased immediately, and the one-time-only deal of visceral factors on behavior and perceptions, and on the stereo system will expire. The once-in-a-lifetime shows how these can be expressed in the verbal and opportunity for enrichment will be lost if one doesn't mathematical language of decision-theory. Section IV entrust one's bank card to the con artist, and there is discusses applications of the proposed theoretical peran unexplained urgency to the insistence that one signs spective. up for EST in the introductory meeting rather than at home after careful deliberation.
II. VISCERAL FACTORS AND BEHAVIOR
Tactics of this type are not, however, restricted to those involved in the selling professions. Interrogators
As visceral factors intensify, they focus attention and use hunger, thirst, and sleep deprivation to extract con-motivation on activities and forms of consumption that fessions. Like Esau, who sold his birthright for a mess are associated with the visceral factor-e.g., hunger of pottage, prisoners may sacrifice years of freedom for draws attention and motivation to food. Non-associated an extra hour of sleep or a glass of water. Lawyers use forms of consumption lose their value (Easterbrook, a similar tactic when taking depositions.
3 The early 1959). At sufficient levels of intensity, individuals will stages of a deposition, when the witness is fresh, are sacrifice almost any quantity of goods not associated used to elicit background information. Information that with the visceral factor for even a small amount of is potentially damaging to the witness or the opposing associated goods, a pattern that is most dramatically side is requested only after the witness begins to tire, lose concentration, and is more likely to make mistakes evident in the behavior of drug addicts. Frawley (1988 , Evolution, however, has its limitations (Gould, 1992 . The same visceral factors that serve the individp. 32) describes addicts as progressively ''eliminating behavior that interferes with or does not lead to drug ual's interests effectively at moderate levels produce distinctly suboptimal patterns of behavior at higher or alcohol use . . . [which] leads to a kind of 'tunnel vision' on the part of the addict.'' Cocaine addicts, ac-levels. Extreme fear produces panic and immobilization rather than effective escape (Janis, 1967; Janis & cording to Gawin (1991 , p. 1581 , ''report that virtually all thoughts are focused on cocaine during binges; nour- Leventhal, 1967) . Uncontrolled anger produces ineffectual, impulsive actions or the opposite, immobilization. ishment, sleep, money, loved ones, responsibility, and survival lose all significance.'' In economic parlance, Intense visceral factors not only undermine effective behavior, but produce extreme misery. This should not the marginal rate of substitution between goods associated with the visceral factor and goods that are not so-surprise us; the 'goal' of evolution is reproduction, not happiness. If hunger ensures that an organism will eat, associated becomes infinitessimal.
Visceral factors also produce a second form of atten-the fact that it is an unpleasant sensation is immaterial. As Damasio (1994, p. 264) argues, visceral factors tion-narrowing: a good-specific collapsing of one's timeperspective toward the present. A hungry person, for tend to be aversive because ''suffering puts us on notice. example, is likely to make short-sighted tradeoffs be-Suffering offers us the best protection for survival, tween immediate and delayed food, even if tomorrow's since it increases the probability that individuals will hunger promises to be as intense as today's. This pres-heed pain signals and act to avert their source or corent-orientation, however, applies only to goods that are rect their consequences.'' associated with the visceral factor, and only to tradeoffs Although visceral factors should be and are taken between the present and some other point in time. A into account in decision making, they also influence hungry person would probably make the same choices behavior more directly. Hunger, thirst, sexual desire, as a non-hungry person between immediate and de-pain, and indeed virtually all visceral factors, can layed money (assuming that food cannot be purchased) influence behavior without conscious cognitive medior immediate and delayed sex. A hungry person might ation (Bolles, 1975) . To illustrate this point, Pribram also make the same choices as a non-hungry person (1984) provides the vivid example of a brain surgery between food tomorrow versus food on the day after patient who ate ravenously with no subjective feeling tomorrow.
of hunger: Yet a third form of attention-narrowing involves the One patient who had gained more than one hundred pounds in self versus others. Intense visceral factors tend to narthe years since surgery was examined at lunch time. Was she row one's focus inwardly-to undermine altruism. Peohungry? She answered, ''No.'' Would she like a piece of rare, juicy steak? ''No.'' Would she like a piece of chocolate candy? She ple who are hungry, in pain, angry, or craving drugs answered, ''Umhumm,'' but when no candy was offered she did tend to be selfish. As interrogators understand all too not pursue the matter. A few minutes later, when the examinawell, sleep deprivation, hunger, thirst, pain, and indeed tion was completed, the doors to the common room were opened most visceral factors, can cause even the most strongly and she saw the other patients already seated at a long table willed individuals to ''betray'' comrades, friends and eating lunch. She rushed to the table, pushed the others aside, family (e.g., Biderman, 1960) . and began to stuff food into her mouth with both hands. She was immediately recalled to the examining room and the quesThe peremptory nature of immediate visceral factors tions about food were repeated. The same negative answers were is generally adaptive. Visceral factors play an imobtained again, even after they were pointedly contrasted with portant role in regulating behavior, and can be obher recent behavior at the table. (p. 24).
served in a wide range of animals. Hunger signals the Further evidence for the direct impact of visceral facneed for nutritional input, pain indicates the impingetors-without deliberative mediation-comes from ment of some type of potentially harmful environmenneuropsychological research. This research shows, for tal factor, and emotions serve a range of interrupting, example, that brain lesions in the reward centers of prioritizing, and energizing functions (Simon, 1967;  the brain can produce a total lack of interest in eating Mandler, 1964; Pluchik, 1984; Frank, 1988) . The ab- (Bolles, 1975) . Electrical stimulation of the same areas sence of even one of these signalling systems detracts can produce complex sequences of behavior without dramatically from an individual's quality of life and conscious mediation (Gardner, 1992, p. 71) . Many of chances of survival. Although most people occasionally the sensory organs have direct nerve connections to wish they could eschew pain, one only has to witness these pleasure/motivation centers, strongly hinting at the playground behavior of children who are congenithe possibility that sensory inputs can have a direct tally incapable of experiencing pain (and to observe the influence on behavior. Electrical stimulation of these perpetual vigilance of their parents) to abandon this fantasy (Fields, 1987, pp. 2-4) .
same regions is so pleasurable that animals will self-administer such stimulation in preference to food, wa-for many actions that are subjectively experienced as purposive by decision makers, electrical impulses assoter, and sex, and will do so until the point of collapse ciated with the action begin fractions of a second before and even death (Olds & Milner, 1954) . Similarly selfany conscious awareness of the intention to act (Libet, destructive patterns of behavior are exhibited by both Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) . animals and humans towards addictive substances,
The issue of cognitive versus visceral control of besuch as crack cocaine, which have a very similar effect havior remains unresolved, and some compromise posion the reward centers of the brain as electrical stimulation may well ultimately prevail. At present, however, tion (Pickens & Harris, 1968) . It is difficult to imagine there is little evidence beyond fallible introspection that this type of behavior reflects the outcome of a ratiosupporting the standard decision-theoretic assumption nal decision process, since the rather rapid conseof complete volitional control of behavior. quence is to eliminate the capacity to experience pleasure altogether. Again, these findings suggest that there are certain types of influences or incentives that
III. SEVEN PROPOSITIONS AND A MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION
operate independently of, and overwhelm, individual deliberation and volition.
Much is known, or at least can plausibly be inferred In contrast to this relatively strong evidence that from available evidence, about the relationship bevisceral factors can influence behavior directly, there is tween deliberation and action under the influence of only weak evidence supporting the standard decisionvisceral factors. The propositions enumerated below theoretic assumption that behavior follows automatican be summarized simply: visceral factors operating cally from deliberation. In fact, the standard decisionon us in the here and now have a disproportionate theoretic assumption seems to be supported by little impact on our behavior. Visceral factors operating in more than introspection. Most people experience their the past or future, or experienced by another individual own actions as resulting from decisions (Pettit, 1991) , are, if anything, underweighted. Although these propoor at least as deliberate. However, it is questionable sitions are simple enough to be stated in words, for whether these introspections represent veridical rethe interested reader I also indicate how they could be ports of underlying decision processes, or ex post ratioexpressed mathematically. nalizations of behavior. The limitation of verbal reports
To represent the influence of visceral factors on beis well established (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) , as is the havior we need a representation of preferences that fact that ''implicit theories'' powerfully influence one's includes a new set of variables, a ti , to represent how perception of the world (Bruner, 1957; Ross, 1989) . Peothe fluctuating levels of the visceral factors affect interple process information in a hyper-Bayesian fashion, temporal utility: ignoring or down-playing evidence that is at variance with their implicit theories while placing great weight on data that is supportive (Lord, Lepper & Ross, 1979) .
Trained to view behavior as the result of attributebased decisions (Pettit, 1991; Christensen & Turner, where U is the total utility of an intertemporal con-1993), most people in Western culture will almost inev-sumption plan, (x t1 , . . . , x tn ) is the consumption vector itably interpret their own behavior accordingly.
at time t, and a Å (a t1 , . . . , a tm ) is the vector of visceral Such a tendency to make retrospective sense of one's factors at time t. In a given experiment, the a parameown preferences and behavior can be seen in research ters will be operationally defined, e.g., as the hours of by Robert Zajonc and his colleagues on the ''mere expo-food deprivation, the presence or absence of food stimsure effect' ' (e.g., Zajonc, 1968) . People are unaware of uli, and so on. We assume that the person knows the the effect of ''mere'' exposure on their preferences, but, values of x, a, and t when choosing between different when preferences are experimentally influenced consumption opportunities. through differential exposure, they readily generate atEquation (1) is the most general temporally separatribute-based explanations for their own preferences ble model, and it allows for the value of any good or (Zajonc & Marcus, 1982) . A subject might decide that activity to be affected by all visceral factors operating he likes polygon number 3, for example, not because he at the same point in time. In many instances, howviewed it 12 times, but due to its geometric symmetry. ever, it is possible to partition visceral factors into Likewise, someone suffering from a tic that causes his subsets that influence only a single consumption hand to fly toward his head periodically will, over time, variable. In the simplest case, each consumption develop a head-itch that requires scratching (Brown, variable, x i , is influenced by at most one visceral factor, a i , as in Eq. (2). 1988 ). Recent neuropsychological research shows that, value of a particular action or consumption alternative,
(2) then proposition 1 implies that
In this equation, v 1 (x t1 , a t1 , t) might be, say, the value If a ú a ú a* i , and v d (x, a, 0) of consuming meal x t1 at time t relative to the present, given that one's hunger will be at level a t1 at that time.
. The separability structure in Eq. (2) implies that the ''conditional'' preference ordering of triples (x ti , a ti , t), This regularity was illustrated in the introduction with holding all else constant, is independent of the levels the example of sleepiness, which can be dealt with in of other consumption variables and visceral factors. a reasonable fashion at low levels, but at high levels Stable preferences across different types of consump-produces self-destructive patterns of behavior such as tion are captured by the function u(v 1 , . . . , v n ). The falling asleep at the wheel. A similar pattern of initially function tells us whether a person prefers dining out reasonable, but ultimately excessive, influence can be to dancing, for instance. The subordinate functions, v i , observed for virtually all visceral factors. Low levels of tell us how the value of particular dining opportunity fear may be dealt with in an optimal fashion (e.g., by hinges on what is offered (x it ), the hunger level (a it ), taking deliberate protective action), but higher levels and delay (t). Each of the v i functions is assumed to be of fear often produce panic or, perhaps worse, immobiliincreasing in the first variable, decreasing in the third, zation (Janis, 1967) . Likewise, low levels of anger can and possibly increasing or decreasing in the second. be factored into daily decision making in a reasonable Further, x i and a i will usually be complements, e.g., way, but high levels of anger often produce impulsive, hunger will enhance a solid meal, but hurt when no self-destructive, behavior. food is forthcoming. I also assume that x i and a i have Proposition 2: natural zero levels. For x i , it is the status quo, or referFuture visceral factors produce little discrepancy between the ence consumption level (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991 ).
value we plan to place on goods in the future and the value we For a i , it is the level a* i such that v(0, a* i , t) Å 0. Intuview as desirable. itively, the natural zero level of a visceral factor is the level at which, in the absence of the relevant form of That is, if a ú a ú a* i , and
nor detracts from utility.
When visceral factors are not having an immediate influence on our behavior, but will be experienced in the future, we are free to give them the weight that we Propositions deem appropriate in decision making. Thus, we posiThe observation that visceral factors influence the tion the alarm clock across the room to prevent sleeping desirability of goods and activities is hardly surprising. late only because we are not currently experiencing the To provide useful insights into behavior it is necessary pain of rising early. Likewise, we avoid buying sweets to specify the nature of this influence with the greatest when shopping after lunch because the evening's cravdetail possible given the available evidence. The follow-ings, however predictable, have little reality to our curing seven propositions, which are summarized in Table rent, unhungry selves. When the future becomes the 1 and discussed in detail below, encode observations present, however, and we actually experience the visconcerning the influence of visceral factors on desired, ceral factor, its influence on our behavior is much predicted, recollected, and actual behavior. Although greater, as implied by proposition 1. all seven have some support from existing research, I
A well-known study of pregnant women's decisions refer to them as propositions to emphasize their tenta-concerning anesthesia illustrates the types of behavtive status.
ioral phenomena associated with proposition 2. Christensen-Szalanski (1984) asked expectant women to Proposition 1: make a non-binding decision about whether to use an-
The discrepancy between the actual and desired value placed on esthesia during childbirth; a majority stated a desire a particular good or activity increases with the intensity of the to eschew anesthesia. However, following the onset of immediate good-relevant visceral factor. Increasing the level of an immediate and delayed visceral factor simultaneously enhances the actual valuation of immediate relative to delayed consumption of the associated good. 4
Currently experienced visceral factors have a mild effect on decisions for the future, even when those factors will not be operative in the future. 5
People underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own future behavior. 6
As time passes, people forget the degree of influence that visceral factors had on their own past behavior. As a result, past behavior that occurred under the influence of visceral factors will increasingly be forgotten, or will seem perplexing to the individual. 7
The first six propositions apply to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal comparisons, where other people play the same role vis a vis the self as the delayed self plays relative to the current self: i. We tend to become less altruistic than we would like to be when visceral factors intensify. ii. When making decisions for another person, we tend to ignore or give little weight to visceral factors they are experiencing iii. Increasing the intensity of a visceral factor for ourselves and another person in parallel leads to a decline in altruism. iv. When we experience a particular visceral factor, we tend to imagine others experiencing it as well, regardless of whether they actually are. v. & vi. People underestimate the impact of visceral factors on other people's behavior. only reason to stop ''using'' is to avoid negative consequences at least some reversals would occur prior to the onset that accompany continuing usage. (p. 152) of labor, but none did. Moreover, the reversal of preference was observed not only for women giving birth for In a similar vein, Osiatynski refers to the tendency to the first time, but also those who had previously experi-underestimate the power of alcohol addiction: ''After enced the pain of childbirth; experience does not seem hitting bottom and achieving sobriety, many alcoholics to go very far in terms of enhancing one's appreciation must get drunk again, often not once but a few times, for future pain.
in order to come to believe and never forget about their A similarly underappreciation of the impact of future powerlessness '' (1992, p. 128) . Osiatynsi argues that a visceral states-again by people with considerable ex-major task of relapse prevention is to sustain the experience-can be seen in the relapse behavior of ad-addict's appreciation for the force of craving and the dicts who, after achieving a period of abstinence, be-miseries of addiction; alcoholics anonymous serves this lieve they can indulge in low level consumption without function by exposing abstinent alcoholics to a continual relapsing. Underestimating the impact of the craving stream of new inductees who provide graphic reports that even small amounts of consumption can produce of their own current or recent miseries. 6 (Gardner & Lowinson, 1993) , such addicts typically Impulsivity find themselves rapidly resuming their original addictive pattern of consumption (Stewart & Wise, 1992) .
The disproportionate response to immediately operaAs Seeburger (1993) a novel account of impulsivity-an alternative to the motivation, the less strong does that very memory become. Becurrently dominant account which is based on non-exfore long, the memory of the pain that one brought on oneself ponential time discounting.
through the addiction begins to pale in comparison to the anticipation of the satisfaction that would immediately attend relapse 6 Personal communication. into the addiction. Sometimes in AA it is said that the farther away one is from one's last drink, the closer one is to the next 7 For a preliminary rendition of this perspective, see Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) . one. That is surely true for alcoholics and all other addicts whose In a seminal article, R. H. Strotz (1955) showed that
The account of impulsivity embodied in propositions 1 and 2 is consistent with the observed differences in a discounted utility maximizer who does not discount impulsivity across goods and situations. It views impulat a constant rate will systematically depart from his sivity as resulting not from the disproportionate attracown prior consumption plans. When the deviation from tiveness of immediately available rewards but from the constant discounting involves higher proportionate disdisproportionate effect of visceral factors on the desircounting of shorter time delays than of long ones, this ability of immediate consumption. It predicts, there-''time inconsistency'' takes the form of temporally myofore, that impulsive behavior will tend to occur when pic or impulsive behavior: spending in the present but visceral factors such as hunger, thirst, physical pain, vowing to save in the future, binge-eating in the pressexual desire, or emotions are intense. In combination, ent while planning future diets, or resolving to quit propositions 1 and 2 imply that people will give much smoking, but not until tomorrow. A standard non-expogreater weight to immediately experienced visceral facnential discounting formulation that predicts impultors than to delayed visceral factors. Thus, according sive behavior is U Å u(x 0 ) / gdu(x 1 ) / gd 2 u(x 2 ), where to proposition 2, the fact that I will be hungry (and d is the conventional exponential discount factor and dying to eat dessert), in pain (and longing for pain killg(õ1) is a special discount factor applying to all periods ers), or sexually deprived in the future has little meanother than the immediate present (see Elster, 1977;  ing to me in the present. If food, pain killers, or sex Akerlof, 1991). The conventional, i.e., constant dishave undesirable consequences I will plan to desist counting, approach is identical, except that g is asfrom these behaviors. When these visceral factors sumed to equal unity. A person who maximizes a funcarise, however, and increase my momentary valuation tion of this type will choose a larger reward x at time of these activities, proposition 1 implies that I will devi-2 over a smaller reward x at time 1 if du(x) ú u(x), but ate from my prior plans. In fact, neither proposition will opt for the smaller, more immediate reward if the 1 nor 2 are necessary conditions for this account of choice is between immediate consumption or consumpimpulsivity; what is required is a somewhat weaker tion at time 1 if gdu(x) õ u(x).
condition which can be expressed as a third proposition. The non-exponential discounting perspective has been bolstered by findings from hundreds of experiProposition 3: ments showing that humans and a wide range of other Increasing the level of an immediate and delayed visceral factor simultaneously enhances the actual valuation of immediate relaanimals, display hyperbolic discount functions of the tive to delayed consumption of the associated good. type predicted to produce impulsive behavior (see, e.g., Chung & Herrnstein, 1967; Mazur, 1987) . Many experi-That is, if a ú a and v(x, a, 0) Å v(x, a, t), then v(x, ments with animals, and a small number with humans, a, 0) ú v(x, a, t). Whereas propositions 1 and 2 deal have also demonstrated the types of temporally based with the effect of visceral factors on the relationship preference reversals that are implied by hyperbolic dis-between actual and desired behavior, proposition 3 counting. Nevertheless, the non-exponential dis-makes no reference to desired behavior and refers only counting perspective has at least two significant limita-to the impact of visceral factors on time preference. The tions as a general theory of impulsivity.
absence of the subjective concept of desired behavior First, it does not shed light on why certain types renders proposition 3 especially amenable to empirical of consumption are commonly associated with impul-investigation. sivity while others are not. People commonly display Like the hyperbolic discounting perspective, the visimpulsive behavior while under the influence of vis-ceral factor perspective predicts that impulsivity will ceral factors such as hunger, thirst, or sexual desire often be associated with short time delays to consumpor emotional states such as anger or fear. The hyper-tion; however, it provides a different rationale for this bolic discounting perspective has difficulty account-prediction and does not predict that short time delays ing for such situation-and reward-specific variations will always produce impulsive behavior. According to in impulsivity.
the hyperbolic discounting perspective, desirability inSecond, the hyperbolic discounting perspective can-creases automatically when rewards become imminot explain why many situational features other than nently available. The visceral factor perspective, in contime delay-for example, physical proximity and sen-trast, assumes that immediate availability produces sory contact with a desired object-are commonly asso-impulsivity only when physical proximity elicits an apciated with impulsive behavior. For example, it is diffi-petitive response (influences an a). Many visceral faccult to explain the impulsive behavior evoked by cookie tors, such as hunger and sexual desire, are powerfully shops that vent baking smells into shopping malls in influenced by temporal proximity. Neurochemical research on animals shows that the expectation of an terms of hyperbolic discounting. imminent reward produces an aversive dopaminic ing times. Apparently the photograph provided a ''picture'' of the benefits of waiting without increasing the state in the brain that is analogous to the impact of child's level of acute hunger or desire. Likewise, and food expectation on hunger (Gratton & Wise, 1994) . explicable in similar terms, instructing children to igThat is, the mere expectation of an imminent reward nore the candies or to cognitively restructure them seems to trigger appetite-like mechanisms at the most (e.g., by thinking of chocolate bars as little brown logs) basic level of the brain's reward system. The account also increased waiting times. of impulsivity proposed here, therefore, predicts that short time delays will elicit impulsivity only when they Vividness produce such an appetitive, or other type of visceral, response.
The notion that various dimensions of proximityShort time delays, however, are only one factor that temporal, physical, and sensory-can elicit visceral incan produce such a visceral response. Other forms of fluences that change behavior also provides a someproximity, such as physical closeness or sensory contact what different interpretation of the often noted effect of (the sight, smell, sound, or feeling of a desired object) vividness. Vividness has a powerful impact on behavior can elicit visceral cravings. Indeed, as the literature on that is difficult to reconcile with the standard decision conditioned craving in animals shows, almost any cue model. Sweepstakes advertise concrete grand prizes associated with a reward-e.g., time of day, the color of such as luxury cars or vacations, even though any nora room, or certain sounds-can produce an appetitive mative model would predict that the monetary equivaresponse (Siegel, 1979) . Perhaps the strongest cue of lent of the prize should have higher value to most indiall, however, is a small taste, referred to as a ''priming viduals. When Rock Hudson and Magic Johnson were dose'' in the neuropharmacological literature on drug diagnosed with AIDS, concern for the disease skyrockaddiction (Gardner & Lowinson, 1993) .
eted (Loewenstein & Mather, 1990) . Well-publicized inMuch of the seminal research of Walter Mischel and cidents of ''sudden acceleration'' and terrorist attacks associates (summarized in Mischel 1974; Mischel, at airports in Europe squelched Audi sales and travel Shoda, & Yuichi, 1992) can be interpreted as demon-abroad by Americans, despite the comparative safety strating the impact of visceral factors on impulsivity. of Audis and foreign travel. Behavioral decision reMischel's research focused on the determinants of de-searchers have acknowledged the impact of vividness lay of gratification in children and was the first to raise (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) , the problem of intraindividual variability in intertem-but have argued that vividness affects decision making poral choice. In a series of experiments, children were via its influence on subjective probability. Vividness is placed in a room by themselves and taught that they assumed to affect the ease with which past instances could summon the experimenter by ringing a bell. The of the outcome can be remembered or future instances children would then be shown a superior and inferior imagined, producing an exaggeration of the outcome's prize and told that they would receive the superior subjective probability via the ''availability heuristic.'' prize if they could wait successfully for the experiVividness, however, has a second, possibly more immenter to return. portant, consequence. Immediate emotions arising One major finding was that children found it harder from future events are inevitably linked to some mental to wait for the delayed reward if they were made to image or representation of those events. There is conwait in the presence of either one of the reward objects siderable research demonstrating that the more vivid (the immediate inferior or delayed superior). The fact such images are, and the greater detail with which they that the presence of either reward had this effect is are recalled, the greater will be the emotional response significant, because conventional analysis of intertem-(e.g., Miller et al., 1987) . Hence, vividness may operate poral choice, including the hyperbolic discounting per-in part by intensifying immediate emotions associated spective, would predict that children would be more with thinking about the outcome rather than (or in likely to wait in the presence of the delayed reward. addition to) increasing the subjective likelihood of the The visceral factor perspective offers a ready explana-outcome. tion for this pattern, since the sight, smell, and physical Many phenomena which have previously been attribproximity of either reward would be likely to increase uted to availability effects on subjective probability the child's level of hunger and desire.
could easily be reinterpreted in these terms. It has been Other findings from Mischel's research are also con-shown, for example, that earthquake insurance pursistent with a visceral factor account of impulsivity. For chases rise after earthquakes when, if anything, the example, showing children a photograph of the delayed objective probability is probably at a low-point but anxiety about these hazards is at a peak (Palm, Hodgson, reward, rather than the reward itself, increased wait-
audience, no doubt reflecting a general human reexperience of one's immediate neighbors, even though neighbors' experiences would seem to provide a better sponse, found themselves incapable of imagining a truly pain-free existence. They instinctively supplied guide to one's own probability of experiencing a flood or earthquake (Kunreuther et al., 1978) . The large in-the pain he did not feel' ' (p. 13 whose specialties are near the lung to stop smoking, Let v represent the individual's prediction at time t õ and each of the examples of vividness listed earlier 0 of the value she will place on consumption at time 0 could also plausibly be attributed to emotion effects (when a visceral factor will be operative). Proposition rather than to changes in subjective probabilities. decisions for the future. Although closely related, the two phenomena have somewhat opposite implications Proposition 4 is probably a minor effect relative to the other six discussed here, and it cannot be expressed for behavior; the failure to appreciate future visceral factors (as implied by proposition 2) increases our likein conditions pertaining to Eq. (2), which assumes that the value of consumption is influenced only by visceral lihood of binding our own future behavior-thus contributing to far-sighted decision making. For example, factors operating at the same point in time. To express proposition 4 mathematically we could allow visceral showing little sensitivity to tomorrow morning's self, we experience no qualms in placing the alarm clock factors operating in the present to influence the value of consumption at other points in time-e.g., v i (x ti , a ti , across the room. The failure to predict our own future behavior (as implied by condition 5), however, det, a 0i ). Proposition 4 would then imply that if a oi ú a 0i and vi(x ti , a ti , t, a 0i ) Å vj(x tj , a tj , t, a 0j ), then vi(x ti , a ti , creases the likelihood that we will take such actions, even when they are necessary. Failing to predict the t, a oi ) § vj(x tj , a tj , t, a 0j ).
The classic illustration of proposition 4 is the ten-next morning's pain of awakening, we may underestimate the necessity of placing the alarm clock on the dency to buy more groceries when shopping on an empty stomach (Nisbett & Kanouse, 1968) . Similarly, other side of the room.
The difficulty of predicting the influence of future when sick we are likely to overreact by cancelling appointments later in the week, only to find ourselves visceral factors on our behavior results partly from the fact that visceral factors are themselves difficult to prerecovered on the following day. It also seems likely that an aggrieved person would decide to take delayed dict. The strength of visceral factors depends on a wide range of influences. Drive states such as sexual desire revenge if immediate revenge were not an option, even if she knew intellectually that her anger was likely to and hunger depend on how recently the drive was satisfied and on the presence of arousing stimuli such as ''blow over.''
The same failure of perspective taking can be ob-potential sexual objects or the proximity of food. Moods and emotions depend on the interaction of situational served in the interpersonal realm. For example, it is difficult for a parent, who feels hot from carrying a factors and construal processes and on internal psychobiological factors. Physical pain and pleasure often debaby, to recognize that his baby might not be as hot. Similarly, it is difficult not to empathize with a pend on sensory stimulation, although construal processes also play an important role (Chapman, 1994) . wounded person even when they report feeling no pain. The latter phenomenon is illustrated vividly by the Because these underlying factors are themselves often erratic, predicting changes in visceral factors is comcase of Edward Gibson, the ''human pincushion.'' A Vaudeville performer who experienced no pain, Gibson mensurately difficult.
Even when visceral factors change in a regular fashwould walk onto the stage and ask a man from the ion, however, people will not be able to predict such suited to storing information about visceral sensations.
Recall of visual images actually activates many of the change if they lack a theory of how they change over time. Thus, Loewenstein and Adler (1995) demon-brain systems that are involved in visual perception (Kosslyn et al., 1993) . Thus, it appears that to imagine strated that people are unable to predict that ownership will evoke attachment to objects and aversion to a visual scene is, in a very real sense, to ''see'' the scene again, albeit in distorted, incomplete, and less vivid giving them up, presumably because they, like social scientists until recently, are unaware of the endow-form. The same probably applies to memory for music and words; one can render a tune in one's head, or ment effect. They elicited selling prices from subjects actually endowed with an object and others who were articulate a word, without producing any externally audible sound. told they had a 50% chance of getting the object. Selling prices were substantially higher for the former group, Except under exceptional circumstances, 8 memory for pain, and probably other visceral factors, appears and the valuations of subjects who were not sure of getting the object were indistinguishable from the buy-to be qualitatively different from other forms of memory. As Morley (1993) observes in an insightful paper, ing prices of subjects who did not have the object.
Moreover, even in the many cases when we can pre-we can easily recognize pain, but few can recall any of these sensations at will, at least in the sense of reexpedict the intensity of a particular visceral factor relatively accurately, we may still have difficulty in pre-riencing them at any meaningful level. Morley distinguishes between three possible variants of memory for dicting its impact on our own future behavior. It is one thing to be intellectually aware that one will be hungry pain: (1) sensory reexperiencing of the pain; (2) remembering the sensory, intensity, and affective qualities of or cold at a certain point in the future and another to truly appreciate the impact of that hunger or cold on the pain without re-experiencing it; and (3) remembering the circumstances in which the pain was experione's own future behavior. If a teenager tries crack once for the experience, how difficult will he or she find it to enced. Most studies of memory for pain have focussed on the second variant and have obtained mixed results. desist from trying it again? How strong will a smoker's desire to smoke be if she goes to a bar where others For example, several studies have examined the accuracy of women's memory of the pain of childbirthare smoking, or the ex-alcoholic's desire for a drink if he attends the annual Christmas party at his place of most employing a so-called visual analog scale (basically a mark made on a thermometer scale) (e.g., Rofé & work? Proposition 5 implies that people who are not experiencing these visceral factors will underestimate Algom, 1985; Norvell, Gaston-Johansson, & Fridh, 1987) . These have been about evenly split in their contheir impact on their own future behavior.
The difficulty of anticipating the effect of future vis-clusions, with about half finding accurate recall of pain (or even slight retrospective exaggeration) and the ceral factors on one's own behavior is also illustrated by a study in which subjects were informed of the Milgram other half finding significant, and in some cases quite substantial, under-remembering of pain. shock experiment findings and were asked to guess what they personally would have done if they had been Morley himself (1993) conducted a study in which subjects completed a two-part survey on pain memosubjects in the experiment. Most subjects in the piggyback study did not think that they themselves would ries. In the first part they were asked to recall a pain event and in the second they were asked questions dehave succumbed to the pressure to shock. Despite their awareness that a substantial majority of subjects deliv-signed to measure the extent of the three variants of ered what they believed were powerful shocks, subjects underestimated the likely effect on their own behavior 8 Traumatic injury may be such a case. Katz and Melzack (1990) argue, based on research on amputees experiencing the ''phantom of being exposed to the authoritative and relentless limb'' phenomenon, that amputees store pain memories in a ''neuropressure of the experimenter.
matrix'' such that they can be retrieved and veridically reexperienced: ''The results of the present study suggest that the somatosenProposition 6: sory memories described here are not merely images or cognitive As time passes, people forget the degree of influence that visceral recollections (although obviously a cognitive component is involved); factors had on their own past behavior. As a result, past behavior they are direct experiences of pain (and other sensations) that resemthat occurred under the influence of visceral factors will seem ble an earlier pain in location and quality'' (p. 333). They summarize increasingly perplexing to the individual. different past studies of phantom limb pain in which 46, 79, 50, 17.5, 37.5, and 12.5% of patients who had lost limbs reported that the If we define v r as the individual's recollection at time t pain mimicked the original pain. There are problems with this re-ú 0 of his own past utility, then, if a ú a ú a* i , and search, most notably the retrospective methodology which introduces
the possibility of recall bias. However, at a minimum, the phantom Human memory is well suited to remembering visual limb research suggests that some people in some situations may, in fact, be capable of remembering pain.
images, words, and semantic meaning, but seems ill-pain memory dimensions. When asked questions about the reality (e.g., Linton, 1991; Rachman & Arntz, 1991) . For such events there is evidence that what people rethe second variant type of pain memory, 59% were able to recall at least some aspect of the pain sensation, member is what they expected to experience beforehand, rather than what they actually experienced while the remaining 41% reported that they had no recall of the pain sensation at all and were thus unable (Kent, 1985) .
A similar pattern holds for emotions. Some emoto rate the vividness of their pain experience. For example, one subject reported ''I remember the pain getting tions are associated with straightforward cognitions.
For example, anger may arise from a perceived inworse and worse, but I can't remember what the pain felt like at all.'' Not a single subject reported actually sult, shame or embarrassment from a faux pas. To the extent that the insult or faux pas can be conjured reexperiencing the pain-i.e., Morley's first variant of pain memory. Consistent with these results, Strong-up in the mind, one can reproduce the emotion at any time, not just at the time when the instigating man and Kemp (1991) found that spontaneous accounts of pain tended to fit Morley's first variant of pain mem-incident occurs (see, Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger, 1985 , p. 1464 . 10 Thus, as for pain, the ability ory-remembering the circumstances in which the pain was experienced. Their subjects were given a list to imagine the impact of future emotions depends on the concreteness and imaginability of the instigating of 12 emotions and were asked for each to remember a time they had experienced the emotion. They found stimuli. Moods or feeling states that have no obvious object, such as sadness or depression, by this reasonthat, ''overwhelmingly, the descriptions were of 'objective' details of the events rather than of the feelings of ing, will be especially prone to anticipatory underestimation, as will pains and discomforts that are not the respondents' ' (p. 195) . Scarry (1985, p. 15 ) notes a similar phenomenon associated with vivid images. The latter observation may help to explain an obserwhen it comes to descriptions of pain; these rarely describe the pain itself, but typically focus either on the vation made by Irena Scherbakowa (personal communication), on the basis of hundreds of interviews conexternal agent of pain (e.g., ''it feels as though a hammer is coming down on my spine'') or on the objective ducted with victims of Stalin's terror. She noted that people who had ''betrayed'' friends or family, or conbodily damage associated with the pain (''it feels as if my arm is broken at each joint and the jagged ends fessed to crimes they didn't commit when they were tortured by such methods as being forced to stand in are sticking through the skin''). Fienberg, Loftus, and Tanur (1985, p. 592) reached virtually the same conclu-one position for hours, or prevented from sleeping, may have been particularly haunted by the memory years sion in their review of the literature on memory for pain which concluded with the question: ''Is it pain that later because it was difficult to understand, in retrospect, why they had succumbed to such seemingly people recall or is it really the events such as injuries and severe illnesses?'' ''mild'' methods. A similar observation was made by Biderman (1960) in his analysis of the retrospective Whether people can remember the sensory, intensity, and affective qualities of a pain (Morley's second reports of 220 repatriated U.S. Air Force prisoners captured during the Korean war. According to Biderman, variant), therefore, or only the events that produced the pain, the evidence is strong that most people cannot ''the failure of the prisoner to recognize the sources of the compulsion he experiences in interrogation intensiremember pain in the sense of reexperiencing it in imagination (Morley's first variant). We can recognize fies their effects, particularly the disabling effects of guilt reactions'' (p. 145). pain all too effortlessly when it is experienced, but only in a limited number of cases actually call it to mind Limitations in the memory for visceral sensations may also help to explain the disappointing results that spontaneously-i.e., recall them-in the same way that we can recall words or visual images. have been obtained by interventions designed to alter behavior by invoking fear. In some such efforts, such There may be certain types of visceral sensations, however, which, if not remembered in Morley's third as trying to ''scare-straight'' at-risk youths by exposing them to life in a maximum security penitentiary, the sense, at least evoke arousal upon recall. For pain, this is true of those for which the pain-causing event can effect seems to have been opposite to what was intended (Finckenauer, 1982; Lewis, 1983) . The standard be imagined vividly. Highly imaginable events such as dentist visits, cuts and wounds, and bone breakage pro-explanation for such an effect is that the fear communication produced a defensive compensatory response. duce immediate anxiety and dread, to the point where the recollection of the event may actually be worse than Perhaps, however, the paradoxical effect resulted from the weakness of the evoked response to the memory. If to proposition 3 states that the weight one places on oneself relative to other persons who are experiencing thinking about incarceration fails to evoke affect, even after touring the facility, perhaps the youths in ques-equivalent levels of a visceral factor increases as the common level of the visceral factor intensifies. Huntion conclude that ''I've experienced the worst, and it must not be that bad since thinking about it leaves me ger, thirst, pain, and fear are all powerful antidotes to altruism (Loewenstein, forthcoming a). cold.'' This conjecture is consistent with research on people's response to minimally, moderately, and Proposition 4 applied to the interpersonal domain implies that people who are themselves experiencing a strongly fear-arousing lectures about dental hygiene (Janis & Feshbach, 1953) . Immediately following the visceral factor will be more empathic toward, and more accurate predictors of, others who are experiencing the communication there appeared to be a monotonic relationship between fear intensity and vigilance; however, same visceral factor. One summer, for example, a friend mentioned his back problems to me. I responded 1 week later the effect of the lectures on behavior was inversely related to fear.
sympathetically, but his pain had little reality until, when working in the garden one day, I suddenly felt In sum, with certain important exceptions, it appears that people can remember visceral sensations at a cog-something ''give'' in my back. My virtually instant reaction was to think of him and to feel deeply for the first nitive level, but cannot reproduce them, even at diminished levels of intensity. It seems that the human brain time what he must have been experiencing all along.
Despite such occasional examples of ''priming,'' howis not well equipped for storing information about pain, emotions, or other types of visceral influences, in the ever, in which one's own weak experience of a visceral factor allow us to empathize with another person's same way that visual, verbal, and semantic information is stored. We can recognize visceral sensations of-stronger one, in general, there seems to be an empathic gulf when it comes to appreciating another person's ten too effortlessly when they occur, but only in a limited number of cases actually call them to mind sponta-pain, hunger, fear, etc. As Elaine Scarry writes with respect to pain, neously-i.e., recall them-in the same way that we can recall words or visual images. Unable to recall visWhen one speaks about ''one's own physical pain'' and about ceral sensations as we can recall other types of informa-''another person's physical pain,'' one might almost appear to be speaking about two wholly distinct orders of events. For the tion, their power over our behavior is difficult to make person whose pain it is, it is ''effortlessly'' grasped (that is, even sense of retrospectively or to anticipate prospectively.
with the most heroic effort it cannot not be grasped); while for the person outside the sufferer's body, what is ''effortless'' is Proposition 7: not grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly unaware of its exisEach of the first six propositions apply to interpersonal as well tence; even with effort, one may remain in doubt about its exisas intrapersonal comparisons, where other people play the same tence or may retain the astonishing freedom of denying its exisrole visavis the self as the delayed self plays relative to the tence; and, finally, if with the best effort of sustained attention current self.
one successfully apprehends it, the aversiveness of the ''it'' one apprehends will only be a shadowy fraction of the actual 'it').
Analogous to proposition 1, actual altruism tends to (1985, p. 4) .
decline relative to desired altruism as visceral factors intensify. A friend related to me the frenzied strug-Scarry argues that pain, uniquely, possesses such an empathic gulf, and attributes it to the poverty of langles between passengers that occurred on a transatlantic flight when the plane suddenly dived and only guage when it comes to expressing pain. While agreeing with her that such a gulf exists, I think it applies about half the oxygen masks dropped. Although fear caused people to become self-centered, it seems likely to a much wider range of feelings than pain, doubt it arises from limitations of linguistic expression, and that even as they grasped for their neighbor's child's mask, they knew that they were violating their own also believe that virtually the same gulf exists when it comes to remembering or anticipating one's own pain moral codes. The self-focusing effects of visceral factors is not surprising given the prioritizing and moti-and other visceral factors. Regardless of the source of such an empathic gulf, its existence implies that, analovating role that visceral factors play in human and nonhuman behavior. Analogous to proposition 2, gous to proposition 5, people will have difficulty predicting the behavior of other people who are experiencwhen making decisions for others, we are likely to ignore or radically underweight the impact of visceral ing intense visceral factors. Just as people underestimated the likelihood that they themselves would have factors on them. Few of the classic tragedies (e.g., Eve and the apple; Macbeth) would have happened if the conformed to the modal pattern of behavior in the Milgram experiment, for example, they also underestiprotagonists had turned over decision-making power to a disinterested party. Combining both of these mated the likelihood that other, superficially described, persons would do so (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) . Finally, analogous propositions, the interpersonal equivalent analogous to proposition 6, the behavior of other people despite the opportunities for data fitting inherent in the typical retrospective design. Even when applied to acting under the influence of visceral factors will seem as incomprehensible as one's own past visceral-factor-gambling-an activity which serves as the central metaphor for the decision making perspective-decision influenced behavior.
Most of the propositions just enumerated, including models have been largely unable to account for the ''stylized'' facts of aggregate behavior, let alone to prethe 7th, are illustrated in William Styron's autobiographical treatise on depression. Depression fits the dict the behavior of individuals. Is it possible that part of the poor fit problem results from the decision making definition of a visceral factor since it has a direct impact on well-being and also influences the relative desirabil-paradigm's failure to take account of visceral factors?
In this section I discuss a variety of patterns and doity of different activities. Proposition 1 (the excessive influence of immediately operative visceral factors) is mains of behavior in which I believe that visceral factors are likely to play an especially prominent role. illustrated by the fact that while he was depressed Styron experienced an almost overwhelming desire to commit suicide, but recognized that this was not in his Drug Addiction self-interest. This latter awareness induced him to seek
In the introduction of Addiction, Avrum Goldstein psychiatric help. Proposition 2 (the underweighting of expresses the central paradox of addiction as follows: future visceral factors), proposition 5 (underestimation of the impact of future visceral factors), and proposition If you know that a certain addictive drug may give you temporary pleasure but will, in the long run, kill you, damage your 6 (the minimization in memory of the impact of past health seriously, cause harm to others, and bring you into convisceral factors) are also all vividly described in the flict with the law, the rational response would be to avoid that book. When Styron was not feeling depressed, he redrug. Why then, do we have a drug addiction problem at all? In ports, depression had little reality to him; indeed, writour information-rich society, no addict can claim ignorance of ing the book was his attempt to come to terms with the consequences.
this lack of intrapersonal empathy. Proposition 4 (the Several different solutions to this riddle have been proprojection of currently experienced visceral factors onto posed. Becker and Murphy (1988) , for example, argue the future) is well illustrated by the feeling he reports, that the addict begins taking the addictive substance while depressed, that the depression will never endwith a realistic anticipation of the consequences. Such all the while recognizing intellectually that this is an account is unsatisfactory not only because it fails to probably false. Finally proposition 7 (the analog befit the facts (e.g., it implies incorrectly that addicts will tween intra-and interpersonal empathy vis à vis the buy in bulk to save time and money in satisfying their effect of visceral factors) is amply illustrated both from anticipated long term habit), but also because it is difhis own perspective and that of others. Prior to his own ficult to understand how the rapid downward hedonic long bout with depression, Styron received a visit from spiral associated with many kinds of addictions can be two friends who were suffering from severe depression, viewed as the outcome of a rational choice. Cocaine but reports that he found their behavior baffling, since addiction, for example, seems to produce a relatively their depression had no reality to him in his own nonderapid diminution in the overall capacity for pleasure pressed state. Later, when he became depressed him- (Gardner & Lowinson, 1993) . Herrnstein and Prelec self, he experienced the same empathic void with re-(1992), in contrast, argue that people become addicted spect to the people around him.
because they fail to notice the small incremental negative effects of the addictive substance. However their APPLICATIONS account fails to explain why people don't get the information from sources other than their own personal experience since, as Goldstein notes, the consequences of A major challenge confronting the decision paradigm is the generally poor ''fit'' achieved in empirical analy-addiction are well publicized.
The theoretical perspective proposed here provides a ses of behavior that are guided by decision theory. In attempts to use decision models to explain or predict somewhat different answer to this question (see, Loewenstein, forthcoming b, for a more detailed discussuch wide-ranging behaviors as job choice, migration, contraception, criminal activity, and self-protective sion). Research on drug addiction suggests that it is not so much the pleasure of taking the drug that produces measures against health, home and work-place risks, the fraction of explained variance has generally been dependency, but the pain of not taking the drug after one has become habituated to it (Gardner & Lowinson, low. Although disappointing results are often attributed to measurement error, the poor fit problem per-1993). This pain is usually subclassified into two components: the pain of withdrawing from the drug and sists even when researchers collect their own data, and the cravings for the drug that arise from ''conditioned from sex. Clearly, the emotions associated with unwanted pregnancy are much more powerful or at least association''-i.e., that result from exposure to persons, places, and other types of stimuli that have be-long-lasting than those associated with sexual spontaneity and enhanced pleasure; however, and consistent come associated with drug taking. Proposition 5 (underestimation of the impact of future visceral factors) with proposition 1, the immediacy and certainty of embarrassment and discomfort seem to overwhelm the implies that people who have not experienced the pains of withdrawal and craving may over-or underestimate delayed and uncertain consequences of using it or failing to use it. 11 Proposition 7 can, perhaps, help to exthe aversiveness of withdrawal and craving, but will almost surely underestimate the likely impact of these plain some of the misguided policies in this area-such as the abstinence movement-which leaves teenagers visceral factors on their behavior. That is, people will exaggerate their own ability to stop taking a particular unprepared for their own feelings and behavior because its proponents underestimate the influence of visceral drug once they have started. Believing that they can stop taking the drug at will, they are free to indulge factors on the behavior of others. their curiosity, which, according to Goldstein (1994, p. Self-protection against sexually transmitted disease. 215) is the driving force in most early drug use.
Based on his own extensive and innovative research Proposition 2 can also help to explain the prevalence on the AIDS-related sexual behavior of gay men, Gold of self-binding behavior among addicts. The alcoholic (1993, p. 1994) argues that much unprotected sex ocwho takes antabuse (assuring him or herself of horrible curs in the heat of the moment but that people can't withdrawal symptoms), the smoker who ventures off remember or predict what the heat felt like and so are into the wilderness without cigarettes (after a final unprepared to deal with it. He believes that the poor smoke at the departure point), and the dieter who signs memory for the ''heat of the moment'' has hampered up for a miserable, hungry, vacation at a ''fat farm'' are researchers who ''have studied only those cognitions all imposing extreme future misery on themselves. To that are present in respondents' minds at the time they those who view these behaviors as the manifestation are answering the researcher's questions (that is, 'in of myopic time preferences, such seemingly far-sighted the cold light of day'), rather than those that are presbehavior may seem anomalous. Proposition 2, however, ent during actual sexual encounters'' (Gold, 1993, p. 4) . suggests that such readiness to impose future pain on Based on his view that gay men forget the influence of oneself has less to do with time preference, and more the heat of the moment (consistent with proposition to do with the unreality of future pain to the currently 6), Gold (1994) ran a study in which he compared the pain-free self. It seems unlikely that alcoholics, smokeffectiveness of a conventional informational interveners, or overeaters would take any of these actions at a tion intended to increase the use of condoms during moment when they were experiencing active craving anal intercourse (exposure to didactic posters) to a new for the substance to which they are addicted.
Sexual Behavior
11 Immediate affect has been found to be a critical determinant of behavior in numerous analyses of decision making. For example, As is true for addiction, volition seems to play an Grasmick, Bursik, and Kinsey (1990) conducted two surveys on littering in Oklahoma City, one just before and one shortly after the ambiguous and often changing role in sexual behavior.
initiation of a successful anti-littering program. The survey asked Although we hold people accountable for their behavior people whether they littered, obtained demographics, and asked as a matter of policy, sexually motivated behavior often questions about shame (e.g., ''Generally, in most situations I would seems to fall into the ''gray region'' between pure voli-feel guilty if I were to litter the highways, streets, or a public recretion and pure compulsion. The following three exam-ation area'') and also about the embarrassment the respondents would feel if they littered. The R2 jumped from .076 to .269 when ples illustrate the applicability of the proposed theoretshame and embarrassment variables were added to the equation ical perspective to sexual behavior. predicting compliance, and the increase in these variables across the surveys mediated the change in mean compliance, strongly sugTeenage contraception. In a recent study of teenage gesting that the effectiveness of the program was due to its success contraceptive behavior, Loewenstein and Furstenberg in attaching an immediate negative emotion to littering. Manstead (1991) found that birth control usage was largely unre- (1995) found that age and sex (typically the two most powerful explanatory variables) dropped out of regression equations predicting lated to the main variables that the decision making risk taking among drivers after controlling for affective variables.
perspective would predict they should be correlated Klatzky and Loewenstein (1995) found that traditional decision makwith-e.g., belief in birth control's effectiveness or the ing variables (probabilities and outcome severities) explained surdesire to avoid pregnancy. The most important corre-prisingly little of the variance in women's breast-self examination lates of birth control usage were embarrassment about behavior relative to subjective reports of anxiety associated with breast cancer and self-examination.
using it and perceptions that it interferes with pleasure ''self-justification'' intervention. Subjects in the self-cases when people experiencing one level of a visceral factor need to make decisions for themselves when they justification group were sent a questionnaire which instructed them to recall as vividly as possible a sexual will be at a different level, rules of thumb, such as ''have sex nightly, regardless of immediate desire,'' may encounter in which they had engaged in unprotected anal intercourse and were asked to indicate which of provide a better guide to behavior than momentary feelings. a given a list of possible self-justifications for having unsafe sex had been in their mind at the moment they had decided not to use a condom. They were then asked Motivation and Effort to select the self-justifications that had been in their Another area in which the decision making perspecmind most strongly at the time, to indicate how reasontive falls short is its treatment of motivation and effort. able each of these seemed to them now, looking back
In the decision paradigm there is no qualitative distincon it; and to briefly justify these responses. The men tion between choosing, say one car over another, or were thus required to recall the thinking they had em-''deciding'' to pick up one's pace in the last mile of a ployed in the heat of the encounter and to reflect on it marathon; both are simply decisions. Years after the in the cold light of day. The percentage of men in the decline of behaviorism, behaviorists still offer the most three groups who subsequently engaged in two or more coherent theoretical perspective on motivation and the acts of unprotected anal intercourse differed dramatimost sophisticated and comprehensive program of recally between the three groups-42 and 41% for the search (see, e.g., Bolles, 1975) . control and poster groups, but only 17% for the selfPhysical effort, and often mental effort as well, often justification group.
produce an aversive sensation referred to as fatigue or, at higher levels, exhaustion. Like other visceral factors, Sex lives of married couples. Recent surveys of sexual behavior suggest that the sex lives of married cou-fatigue and exhaustion are directly aversive, and alter the desirability of different activities; most promiples tend to be even worse (in terms of frequency) than what most people already suspected. For example, a nently, they decrease the desirability of further increments of effort. Proposition 1 implies that as exhausrecent study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (Michael, Gagnon, Laumann & Kolata, tion increases, there will be an ever-increasing gap between actual and desired behavior. Anyone who has 1994) found that the average frequency of intercourse of married couples declined markedly as a function of engaged in competitive sports, or who has taught for several hours in a row can confirm this prediction; reyears of marriage. Certainly some of this drop-off reflects the combined effects of soured relations, dimin-gardless of the importance of performing well, and even with full knowledge that one will recover from the exished attraction, etc. What is surprising, as reported in the same study, is that many couples enjoy sex quite haustion virtually immediately after suspending the activity, sustained performance is often impossible to a lot when it actually occurs. The visceral factor perspective can perhaps shed some additional light on the achieve. Proposition 5 implies that people will overestimate their own ability to overcome the effect of faanomaly posed by the failure to take advantage of an obvious opportunity for gratification.
tigue-they will exaggerate the degree to which they can overcome limitations in physical conditioning, conIn the early stages of a relationship, the mere thought of sex, or the physical proximity of the other centration, etc. through sheer willpower, and proposition 6 implies that, as time passes, people increasingly partner is sufficient to produce significant arousal. It is easy to understand this arousal in evolutionary come to blame themselves for deficiencies in their own prior effort level because they will forget their own past terms, and indeed research has shown that rats, cattle, and other mammals can be sexually rejuvenated fol-exhaustion. Proposition 7 predicts that people who are observing the effort output of others will have a difficult lowing satiation by the presentation of a new partnerthe so-called ''Coolidge Effect' ' (Bowles, 1974) . Thus, time understanding or predicting reductions in effort output. Watching speed-skaters during the Olympics, early in a relationship one initiates sex in a visceral state not unlike that associated with the sex act itself. for example, I found it difficult to understand why they failed to maintain their pace in the face of such overRepeated presentation of the same sexual partner, however, diminishes initial arousal. Proposition 5 im-whelming incentives.
Many of the tactics that people use to motivate themplies that people who are not aroused will have difficulty imagining how they will feel or behave once they selves in the face of fatigue and exhaustion can be described by the observation that you can only fight visbecome aroused. It can thus explain why couples fail to initiate sex despite ample past experience showing ceral factors with other visceral factors. Thus, a common tactic for mustering willpower is to attempt to that it will be pleasurable if they do. As in so many imagine, as vividly as possible, the potential positive nally, Thaler and Shefrin's (1981) ''planner/doer'' model consequences of greater effort output, or the potential adopts a principal-agent framework in which a farnegative consequences of insufficient output. When I sighted planner (the principle) attempts to reconcile lived in Boston many years ago, a friend and I would the competing demands of a series of present-oriented regularly drive to West Virginia to go canoeing, and doers (the agents). would typically drive back days later in the middle of
The strength of multiple self models is that they the night. During these long drives I would remain transfer insights from a highly developed field of reawake at the wheel by imagining myself ringing the search on interpersonal interactions to the less studied doorbell of my friend's parents house to announce that topic of intraindividual conflict. However, the usehe had died in a car crash. The effectiveness of mental fulness of the multiple self approach is limited by imimagery in eliciting an emotional response explains not perfections in the analogy between interpersonal and only why it is commonly used as an emotion-induction intrapersonal conflict. There is an inherent asymmetry method in research, but also may also help to explain between temporal selves that does not exist between its prominent role in decision making (c.f., Pen-different people. People often take actions that hurt nington & Hastie, 1988; Oliver, Robertson, & Mitchell, themselves materially to either reward or punish oth-1993). Not only does imagery provide a tool for deciding ers who have helped or hurt them. In the intrapersonal between alternative courses of action but, once a reso-domain, however, people cannot take actions for the lution has been made, it may also help to stimulate the purpose of rewarding or punishing their past selves. emotional response needed to implement the decision. Another form of asymmetry arises from the fact that Multiattribute analytical evaluation seems unlikely to attempts at self control are almost always made by provide such a motivational impetus.
the far sighted self against the short-sighted one, and almost never in the opposite direction. Consistent only Self-Control with the planner-doer model, there is little camaraderie between successive short-sighted selves, but much One of the most difficult patterns of behavior to sub-more of a sense of continuity between far-sighted sume under a conventional rational choice framework, selves. For example, when people ''decide'' to sleep in, and one that has received increasing attention in the they rarely disable the alarm clock to promote the literature, is the phenomenon of intrapersonal conflict cause of tomorrow morning's sluggish self; however, and self-control. People sometimes report feeling as if when not actually experiencing the misery of premathough there were two selves inside them-one more ture arousal, we might well make a policy decision to present-and one more future-oriented-battling for place the alarm clock away from the bed every night. control of their behavior. To express the introspective Perhaps the most significant problem with multiple sensation of intra-individual conflict, a number of peoself models is that they are metaphorical and not deple have proposed different types of ''multiple self '' scriptions of what we think actually takes place in inmodels that apply to intrapersonal conflict preexisting trapersonal conflict. Advocates of the multiple self apmodels that have been developed to describe strategic proach do not believe that there are little selves in interactions between different people. people with independent motives, cognitive systems, Schelling's multiple self model (1984) , for example, and so on. Thus, it is difficult to draw connections beconstitutes a relatively straightforward application of tween multiple self models and research on brain neuhis pioneering research on commitment tactics in interrochemistry or physiology beyond the rather simplistic personal bargaining to intrapersonal conflict. In his observation that the brain is not a unitary organism. model a series of far-sighted selves who would prefer
The visceral factor perspective, and its key assumpto wake up early, eat in moderation, and desist from tion that intense visceral factors cause behavior to dealcohol, use a variety of precommitment techniques to part from perceived self-interest, provides a better fit control the behavior of their more short-sighted counto the stylized facts than do multiple self models. The terparts. Elster (1985) , somewhat differently, sees inintrospective feeling of multiple selves, for example, trapersonal conflict as a ''collective action problem'' inarises from the observation that one is clearly behaving volving the succession of one's selves. Such a perspeccontrary to one's own self interest. Since we are used tive sheds special light on the phenomenon of to interpreting behavior as the outcome of a decision, unraveling. Just as one person's cutting in line can it is natural to assume that there must be some selfcause a queue to disintegrate into a state of anarchy, other than the self that identifies one's self-interestthe first cigarette of someone who has quit, or the first that is responsible for the deviant behavior. The fact drink of an ex-alcoholic, often usher in a resumption of the original self-destructive pattern of behavior. Fi-that impulsive selves never promote one-another's be-havior is not surprising if these selves are not, in fact, ity. In everyday language, the term irrationality is typically applied to impulsive and self-destructive behavior coherent entities with consciousness and personal motives, but instead represent the motivational impact of and to actions that violate generally accepted norms about the relative importance of different goals. visceral factors. The far-sighted self, in contrast, represented by the individual's assessment of self-interest,
The theoretical perspective proposed here views irrationality not as an objective and well-defined phenomeis much more constant over time. The far-sighted self can, in a sense, represent the individual's tastes, fac-non, but as a subjective perception that occurs in the mid-range of the continuum defined by the influence of toring out as much as possible the effect of visceral factors.
visceral factors. At low levels of visceral factors, people generally experience themselves as behaving in a rational fashion. At extremely high levels, such as the level
CONCLUDING REMARKS
of sleepiness that causes one to fall asleep at the wheel, decision making is seen as arational-that is, people The decision-making paradigm, as it has developed, don't perceive themselves as making decisions at all. is the product of a marriage between cognitive psychol-It is in the middle region of visceral influences, when ogy and economics. From economics, decision theory people observe themselves behaving contrary to their inherited, or was socialized into, the language of prefer-own perceived self-interest, that they tend to define ences and beliefs and the religion of utility maximiza-their own behavior as irrational. Expressions such as tion that provides a unitary perspective for under-''I don't know what got into me,'' or ''I must have been standing all behavior. From cognitive psychology, deci-crazy when I . . .'' refer to discrepancies between besion theory inherited its descriptive focus, concern with havior and perceived self-interest that are produced by process, and many specific theoretical insights. Deci-the influence of visceral factor. As proposition 7 would sion theory is thus the brilliant child of equally brilliant imply, moreover, the same expressions are used to refer parents. With all its cleverness, however, decision the-to the irrational behavior of others that is difficult to ory is somewhat crippled emotionally, and thus de-comprehend as self-interested. In sum, the visceral factached from the emotional and visceral richness of life. tor perspective helps to explain when and why people Contrary to the central assumption of decision the-view their own, and others', behavior as irrational. ory, not all behavior is volitional, and very likely most
The second problem resulting from the failure to take of it is not. This is not a novel critique, but most recent account of the impact of visceral factors, is a widecritiques along these lines have attacked from the oppo-spread skepticism toward the decision making perspecsite angle. A number of researchers have argued that tive, on the part of both the general public and of acamost behavior is relatively ''automatic'' (Shiffrin, Du-demics in the humanities. A commonly heard complain mais & Schneider, 1981), ''mindless'' (Langer, 1989) , is that decision theory fails to capture what makes peohabitual (Ronis, Yates & Kirscht, 1989; Louis & Sutton, ple ''tick,'' or what it means to be a person (c.f., Epstein, 1991) , or rule-guided (Anderson, 1987; Prelec, 1991 Prelec, ). 1994 . People who introspectively experience high conWhile not disputing the importance of habitual behav-flict in their personal lives are unlikely to embrace a ior, my focus is on the opposite extreme-one that, theory of behavior that denies such conflict or that, at while perhaps less prevalent than habitual behavior, best, treats it as a matter of balancing competing reapresents a more daunting challenge to the decision sons for behaving in different ways (Tversky & Shafir, making perspective. My argument is that much behav-1992). The dismaying consequence of decision theory's ior is non-volitional or only partly volitional-even in lack of general appeal is a widespread tendency for situations characterized by substantial deliberation.
those in the humanities and in the general public to The failure to incorporate the volition-undermining fall back on outmoded theoretical accounts of behavior influence of emotions and other visceral factors can be such as those proposed by Freud and his followers. The seen not only in the disappointing explanatory power of task of decision researchers, as I see it, is to try to decision models, but also in two additional significant breathe more life into decision models without losing problems faced by the decision-making perspective. the rigor and structure that are the main existing The first is the counterintuitive notion of ''irrationality'' strengths of the perspective. Incorporating the influthat has arisen in a field which has irrationality as a ence of visceral factors, I hope, is a step in that direccentral focus. As Daniel Kahneman notes (1993), con-tion. temporary decision theorists typically define irrational-
